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Hermeneutics and the Ancient Philosophical Legacy: Hermēneia and Phronēsis
JUSSI BACKMAN
Hermeneutics as we understand it today is an essentially modern phenomenon.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1990, 323–326; 1996, 242–245) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1990,
177–180; 2004, 175–177) point out that its two principal forms, philological and
theological hermeneutics, emerged from early modernity’s new desire to
reappropriate the texts of a paradigmatic past—the writings of classical antiquity for
Renaissance humanists, the biblical canon for the Protestant Reformation—on their
“own terms,” without relying on the unquestioned authority of the mediating
tradition (the Latin Middle Ages and its patristic and ecclesiastical traditions)
through which those texts had been transmitted. This task naturally required a new
emphasis on methods of interpretation and textual criticism. The use of the term
hermeneutics in  the  sense  of  a  scholarly  discipline  of  interpretation  derives  from  a
seventeenth-century Lutheran theologian, Johann Conrad Dannhauer.1
As for philosophical hermeneutics in the pregnant, Heideggerian and
Gadamerian, sense, it is a specific product of “late” modernity—a properly
postmodern form of thought, if we follow Gianni Vattimo (2002, 113–181). The
unfolding of the modern age—marked by Europe’s expanding encounters with non-
European cultures, the Enlightenment idea of the historical progress of knowledge,
culture, and society, the Romantic notion of the radical individuality of cultural
expressions, and the emergence of the new historical “human sciences” in the
nineteenth century—finally convinced Western philosophy of the irreducibility of
the dimension of historicity and cultural specificity inherent in language, experience,
2and meaning, and of the profound philosophical importance of interpretive
understanding. This conviction came into fruition in the post-Hegelian historical
consciousness that Jürgen Habermas (1988, 41; 1992, 34) identifies as one of the
central components of contemporary “postmetaphysical thinking.”
The following observations will briefly illustrate some of the central ways in
which these modern and late modern phenomena relate to the ancient philosophical
legacy. First, the roots of hermeneutics will be traced to ancient views on linguistic,
textual, and sacral interpretation. We will then take a look at certain fundamentally
unhermeneutic elements of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Augustinian “logocentric”
theory of meaning that philosophical hermeneutics and its heirs sought to call into
question, reconsider, and deconstruct. Finally, Aristotle’s practical philosophy,
particularly the notion of phronēsis, “practical insight,” will be designated as an
implicit ancient prototype of hermeneutic thinking, the reappropriation of which lay
at the core of the Heideggerian and Gadamerian philosophical projects.
The Ancient Roots of Philological and Theological Hermeneutics
Ancient thought did not distinguish hermeneutics as a specific theoretical discipline
or general method of interpretation. The only classical mention of a particular
hermēneutikē (technē), an interpretive art, is found in Plato’s Statesman (260d11, and
also in the probably spurious Epinomis 975c6)  in  a  limited  sense  to  which  we  will
presently return.
This does not mean that the theoretical problems of interpretation and
understanding were absent or irrelevant. Herodotus’s Histories shows how keenly
the Greeks of the classical age were interested in the different customs, institutions,
and sacred rites of other societies, particularly those of mighty older civilizations
such as Egypt, to which Herodotus considers Greek culture greatly indebted.
However, there was a strong sense of intercultural continuity without specific
linguistic or cultural gaps in mutual comprehensibility, combined with a certain
cultural universalism. Herodotus straightforwardly assigns Greek counterparts to
Egyptian deities, stating his belief (Historiae 2.3) that all human beings are equally
knowledgeable about the gods—an approach later continued by the Romans in the
3interpretatio Romana, the assimilation of Greek and barbarian deities. Jean Grondin
(1995, 25–26) points out the Greeks’ remarkable lack of interest in the practice and
theory of textual translation; they considered their literary heritage to be more or less
autarkic. Literary translation was in many ways a Roman invention; Livius
Andronicus’s Latin translation of Homer’s Odyssey in the mid-third century BCE
introduced the novel concept of rendering an entire work of literature into another
language. Even in the Roman context, the cultivated elite was expected to be able to
read the Greek originals,  and until  late antiquity, when knowledge of Greek began
to decline sharply in the West, translations were primarily limited to Latin
“remakes” of Greek poetry and drama (cf. Cameron 2011, 527–535).
On the other hand, like Renaissance humanists and Protestant reformers, the
classical Greeks had a particular textual heritage of their own that was separated
from them by centuries but regarded as culturally paradigmatic—the Homeric epics.
Systematic philology and textual criticism evolved at the Hellenistic libraries of
Alexandria and Pergamon primarily as an attempt to secure and canonize the correct
text of Homer’s works (see Sandys 1967, 105–166). Even in spite of their status as
historical, ethical, and aesthetic models, the Homeric epics, particularly their
attributions of very human imperfections and misdemeanors to the gods, easily
offended later sensibilities; Homer was reproached for this as early as the sixth
century BCE by Xenophanes  of  Colophon (21  B 11,  in  Diels  and Kranz 1951 [DK]).
This gave rise to the allegorical method of interpreting, reportedly first adopted by
Xenophanes’ younger contemporary Theagenes of Rhegium (DK 8 A 2; cf. Hersman
1906, 10), which attributes to Homeric texts “deeper meanings” (hyponoiai) beyond
the literal and manifest ones, turning the Homeric gods into figurative names for
abstract entities such as the physical elements, virtues, or intellectual capacities.
Allegorical explanation had become an established practice by the time of Plato, who
rebukes  it  (Republic 2.378d3–8)  as  an  inefficient  device  (whether  true  to  Homer’s
intent or not) for circumventing Homer’s potentially demoralizing effect on the
youth.
Through the Homeric interpretations of the Presocratics (Anaxagoras of
Clazomenae, Metrodorus of Lampsacus), Hellenistic and late ancient writers
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as the biblical exegetics of Philo of Alexandria, Origen, and Augustine, allegory
dominated (but not exclusively; see Dawson 1992, 52–72) the ancient and medieval
theory of interpretation. It was systematized by John Cassian (Collationes 14.8) in the
fourth century CE into the famous classification of the different “spiritual” layers of
meaning of the scripture (the allegorical, the “tropological” or moral, and the
“anagogical” or prophetic) as opposed to its literal or historical meaning. It should
be  noted,  however,  that  an  allegorical  reading  does  not  really  presuppose  any
fundamental hermeneutic distance between text and interpreter, but is rather a way
of accounting for the foreign or unacceptable elements and expressions of a text
without assuming a basic intercontextual difference. The allegorical apologist
“defends” and “explains” the relevant author as if this author were a contemporary
(cf. Dawson 1992, 47).
There was one context of interpretation, however, that Greek culture did
regard as indeed involving an irreducible distance, one that always made
interpretations uncertain, equivocal, and insufficient renderings of radically foreign
meanings: the mediation between gods and human beings, thought to be the
function of the divine messenger Hermes, the presumed namesake of hermeneutics.2
There  was  a  general  understanding  that  the  gods  express  themselves  to  mortals
indirectly and implicitly, through omens, signs, and cryptic statements mediated by
inspired oracles: “The lord whose oracle [manteion] is at Delphi [i.e., Apollo] neither
speaks out [legei] nor conceals [kryptei], but indicates [sēmainei]” (Heraclitus DK 22 B
93). The minds of the gods were as such inaccessible to humans; one simply had to
make  what  one  could  of  whatever  signals  available,  most  often  with  the  help  of
professional interpreters.
Diotima of Mantineia, in her teachings related by Socrates in Plato’s Symposium
(202d13–203a8), describes the realm of the “daimonic” (to daimonion) as filling up an
intermediate space between the gods and human beings and thereby connecting
these two inherently separate realms into a unified and consistent whole. A god,
says Diotima, does not interact (meignytai) with a human being directly; all
conversation (dialektos) between the divine and the human takes place through the
5mediation  of  the  daimonic,  which  acts  as  interpreter  (hermēneuon) and transmitter
(diaporthmeuon) between them and thus constitutes the sphere of mantikē, the art of
the divinely inspired seer (mantis, connected to mania, divine frenzy), accordingly
characterized as a “daimonic” human being. From the context of Plato’s mention of
hermēneutikē (Statesman 260d11)—closely connected with mantikē and characterized
as an art involving commanding or prescribing (epitattein)—it is evident that what is
first and foremost meant is precisely this “daimonic” art of interpreting the counsels
of the gods.
Even the textual interpretation of literary works was importantly oriented
toward the sacral dimension. As we have seen, what most interested the allegorical
readers of Homer were his accounts of the gods; for example, the treatise Homeric
Problems by the first-century BCE author Heraclitus is subtitled “On Homer’s
Allegories Concerning the Gods,” and it attributes (3.1) to Homer a veneration of
“all daimonic things” on the basis of the fact that Homer himself is divine (theios). In
Plato’s Ion (533c9–536d3), poets are portrayed as “interpreters” of the gods in the
sense of inspired mouthpieces through which the divine affairs find verbal
expression in human language, and this effect is reproduced on a secondary level by
the rhapsodes, professional performers of poet’s works. The poets and rhapsodes
have no rational epistemic command of the message that they transmit; like oracular
pronouncements, poetic words simply verbalize the transcendence of the divine
sphere, without making it transparent or comprehensible. With regard to the divine,
the poets function precisely as soothsayers (chrēsmōdoi) and diviners (manteis; 534d1).
The predominantly sacral and theological orientation of theories of
interpretation until Friedrich Schleiermacher’s general hermeneutics in the early
nineteenth century is thus one of the most important aspects of the ancient and
medieval legacy of modern hermeneutics. Through the influence of Judaism and
Christianity, sacral interpretation lost its connection with divination and became
essentially textual exegesis, incorporating many of the methods of Alexandrian
philology. In this sense, Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, which lays out specific
textual rules and guidelines for interpreting the scripture on the basis of a the notion
of  the  biblical  texts  as  human  attempts  to  articulate  and  praise  the  ineffable
6transcendence of  God (1.6),  can be  regarded as  an epitome and culmination of  the
ancient protohermeneutic heritage, theological as well as philological (cf. Heidegger
1988a, 12; 1999, 9; Gadamer 1974, 1062).
Language as Hermēneia and the “Logocentric” Theory of Meaning
As we have seen, the roots of hermeneutics as a general theory of interpretation can
be traced to antiquity. However, in the light of the notions of language and linguistic
meaning predominant in ancient philosophy, the idea of a philosophical
hermeneutics that would place interpretation at the very heart of discursive thought
remained utterly foreign.
Heidegger (1988a, 9–10; 1999, 6–8; 2001, 37–38; 2010, 35) emphasizes that his
radicalized  notion  of  hermeneutics  is  based  on  a  specific  wide  sense  of  the  Greek
hermēneia: verbalization, enunciation, and linguistic articulation. We find this
meaning in Ion:  the  kind  of  “interpretation”  practiced  by  poets  and  rhapsodes  is
simply verbal expression and vocalization, not explication or elucidation aimed at an
articulate understanding. It is only in this sense that Aristotle’s treatise on discursive
articulation and linguistic syntax, Peri hermēneias (De interpretatione),  is  really  a
treatise “on interpretation.” The famous opening of the work indicates its
fundamentally unhermeneutic point of departure:
Vocal utterances [ta  en tē phōnē] are tokens [symbola] of experiences [pathēmata] in the
soul, and written signs are tokens of vocal utterances. Just as written signs are not the
same for all, so vocalizations are not the same; but the primary experiences in the soul
that they signify are the same for all, as are also the things [pragmata] to which these
experiences conform [hōn . . .  homoiōmata]. (De interpretatione 1.16a3–8)
Written and vocalized material expressions are conventional (kata synthēkēn;
16a26–28)  tokens  of  a  prelinguistic  discourse,  that  is,  of  the  way in  which reality  is
experienced and articulated in discursive thinking, described by Aristotle in De
interpretatione and in De anima 3  as  a  process  of  differentiating (diairesis)  as  well  as
connecting (synthesis) semantic elements into the basic propositional composite form
7of  subject  or  noun  (onoma)  and  predicate  (rhēma). While propositionally structured
thoughts are in themselves discursive “interpretations” of reality that are already
prone to error (De anima 3.3.427b16–429a9; 3.6.430a26–b30; De interpretatione 1.16a9–
18),  they  are  not  “symbolic”  but  rather  a  natural  way  in  which  consciousness
“conforms”  to  reality,  and  thus  move  in  a  universal  medium.  Spoken  and  written
expressions belong to a particular language or system of writing, but the notions
they signify are the same for all.3
This principle effectively removes the need for linguistic interpretation in the
radical hermeneutic sense, which presupposes that the speaker’s thoughts and
intentions  are  no more “universal”  or  “ideal”  than the  language in  which they are
inscribed,  but  rather  in  themselves  thoroughly  conditioned  by  that  language  as  a
discursive system. From the Aristotelian perspective, linguistic expressions are
simply material (vocal or graphic) “translations” of a primordial immaterial
discourse, of thinking (dianoia) in the Platonic sense of the soul’s voiceless “discourse
with itself” (Sophist 263e3–9). Understanding them simply involves translating them
back  into  the  “language  of  thought,”  that  is,  recapturing  the  original  discursive
experiences verbalized by the author. We find a similar principle in Augustine’s
account of how,
when we speak, in order that what we bear in the soul may flow into the soul of the
hearer through fleshly ears, the word [verbum] which we carry in our hearts becomes
an outward sound and is called speech [locutio]; and yet our thought [cogitatio] is not
transformed into that sound, but remains untouched [integra] in itself, and assumes a
vocal form in which it is introduced to the ears without being modified in itself by the
change. (De doctrina christiana 1.13)
The Aristotelian and Augustinian notions of linguistic meaning are
paradigmatic examples of what Derrida (1967, 71–72; 1997, 49) characterizes as the
traditional “logocentric” tendency to conceive the material chain of signs and
references as ultimately reducible to an immaterial level of ideal and universal
meanings. This, in turn, is one facet of the general “ontotheological” hierarchy
attributed by Heidegger (1991, 207–210; 1998b, 311–315; 2002a, 31–67; 2002b, 42–74)
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approach, in which ontology (the study of being qua being) is ultimately realized in
the form of theology (the study of the supreme kind of being; see Aristotle,
Metaphysics 6.1.1026a23–32), the various levels and senses of being are progressively
referred back to more fundamental, self-sufficient, and “substantial” levels and
senses and, finally, to a perfectly autarkic instance of being. For Aristotle
(Metaphysics 12.7.1072a19–b30; 12.9.1074b15–1075a10), this is the metaphysical
divinity as the perfectly self-immanent self-awareness. According to Heidegger (see,
e.g., 1998a, 147–148, 154; 2000, 206–208, 216–217; 2001, 25–26; 2010, 24–25), the
fundamental ontotheological standard of being is constant presence or accessibility,
and the most constant kind of presence is one that no longer refers to anything
outside or beyond itself. Put in another way, ontotheology seeks a path beyond all
contextuality, a point of reference that would be absolute in the literal sense of being
“absolved” (cf. Heidegger 2002c, 102; 2003a, 136) from all constitutive references to
anything other than itself—an ultimate “transcendental signified” that would no
longer be “textual” in the Derridean sense of being caught in an indefinite process of
the referral and deferral of meaning (différance; Derrida 1972, 13–14; 1982, 13).
Philosophical hermeneutics, however, is precisely the philosophy of discursive
contextuality. It regards meaning and understanding as irreducibly context-sensitive
and historically and culturally situated and accepts no universal, ideal level of
discourse that would precede its inscription into different material languages,
maintaining that the thoughts, notions, and intentions one is capable of having are
specific to one’s cultural-linguistic situation.  “[T]he ideality of the meaning lies in
the word itself. . . . Experience is not wordless to begin with. . . . Rather, experience
of itself seeks and finds words that express it” (Gadamer 1990, 421; 2004, 417).
Philosophical hermeneutics thus abandons the prospect of attaining an ultimate, pre-
or supra-contextual point of reference. Its maxim is captured by Gadamer’s (1990,
478; 2004, 470) famous formulation: “Being that can be understood is language.” To the
extent  that  anything  can  be  understood,  that  is,  experienced  as  meaningful  and
discursively interpreted, it can be understood in the way a linguistic expression is
9understood, that is, (con)textually—by considering it as a part of a wider “text,” that
is, of a context or framework.
However,  the  basic  dynamic  of  the  hermeneutic  circle  (Heidegger  2001,  152–
153; 2010, 147–149; Gadamer 1990, 270–281; 2004, 268–278) implies that the context is
itself never static but dynamic, always in the state of temporal and historical
becoming.  Every  meaningful  experience  is  approached  in  terms  of  a
“preunderstanding” consisting of earlier interpretations and articulations of relevant
earlier experiences. There is no experience without “presuppositions.” However, a
preunderstanding is never definitive; since every new experience is as such singular
and unprecedented, it also gives an opportunity to “test” one’s presuppositions and
thereby to enrich and transform them (Gadamer 1990, 311, 373; 2004, 305, 361). As a
putting to test of one’s preunderstanding in the light of one’s concrete singular
experiences, interpretation can only be a productive event in which the dialogue
between one’s own particular experience and one’s inherited discourses can yield an
entirely new meaningful situation, a synthetic “fusion of horizons”
(Horizontenverschmelzung; 1990, 305–312; 2004, 299–306). For philosophical
hermeneutics, all hermēneia, all articulation of meaningful experiences, is always also
an interpretation of a discursive context consisting of earlier articulations—a
dialogue with inherited ways of speaking that has the power to produce new,
transformed discourse. To understand is not to reproduce a preexisting ideal
meaning, but to reinterpret, to produce new meaning by adapting previous
discourse to a new situation.
Aristotelian Phronēsis as a Model for Philosophical Hermeneutics
Even though we can see that the premises of philosophical hermeneutics are at odds
with some of the basic presuppositions of ancient thought, we must highlight the
fact that both Heidegger and Gadamer nevertheless discovered one of their
methodological starting points and basic resources within Greek philosophy, within
the inexhaustible richness of the Aristotelian corpus itself. This point of departure is
the account of phronēsis, “prudence,” “practical insight,” or “circumspection,” in
Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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Nicomachean Ethics 6  is  an  account  of  the  “intellectual  virtues”  (arētai
dianoētikai), the human excellences related to discursive rational thought and
awareness. There are five main dispositions (hexeis) through which the soul attains
truth (alētheuei), that is, discloses and discovers meaningful reality, in a discursively
structured  way:  art  or  skill  (technē), scientific knowledge (epistēmē),  prudence  or
practical insight (phronēsis), wisdom or theoretical understanding (sophia),  and  the
intuitive intellect (nous; 6.3.1139b15–17). Epistēmē is the capacity to derive valid
systematic knowledge about the intelligible structures of reality from a set of first,
immutable principles (archai; 6.3.1139b18–36; 6.6.1140b31–35), and sophia is  a
comprehensive understanding of these structures, one that combines intuitive
insight into the first principles with the knowledge of what follows from them
(6.7.1141a9–20, 28–b8). Nous is in itself nondiscursive and immediate, and appears in
the context of discursive thought first and foremost as a component of sophia, as the
intuitive apprehension of principles (6.6.1140b31–1141a8), not in the pure, “divine”
form described in Metaphysics 12. These three virtues constitute the “scientific”
(epistēmonikon) faculty of the soul for knowing things with immutable principles,
that is, for attaining fundamental and universal truths. Technē and phronēsis, by
contrast, are based on the “calculative” (logistikon) faculty for reckoning with
(logizesthai) and deliberating about (bouleuesthai) contingent and changing matters;
they grasp reality from a purpose-oriented viewpoint in the form of “practical
truths” (6.1.1139a6–6.2.1139b13). Technē, the rational and articulate “technical”
capacity  for  finding the  appropriate  means in  order  to  attain  given ends,  relates  to
particular instrumental situations of making or producing (poiēsis; 6.4.1140a1–23).
Phronēsis, however, relates to particular situations of action (praxis), of performing
deeds and of choosing how to live one’s life, not simply in view of some particular
goal or end, but in order to enact the good and appropriate way of life, “the human
good,” as a whole (6.5.1140a24–b30, 6.7.1141a20–28, b8–6.8.1142a30). It is a “truth-
disclosing [alēthē]  and  discursive  [meta logou] practical disposition concerning that
which is good and that which is bad for the human being” (6.5.1140b4–6).
Of particular relevance in the Aristotelian account of phronēsis is for Heidegger
its specific temporality, which is fundamentally oriented to the future as a
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dimension of possibilities (6.2.1139b7–9). Being prudent (phronimos) essentially
involves  a  capacity  for  forethought  or  providence  (dynamis pronoētikē; 6.7.1141a26–
28)4; prudence is the ability to consider (theōrein), in each case, one’s own particular
situation (ta peri hauto hekasta) in an appropriate way (6.7.1141a25–26), that is, in the
light of one’s own essential possibilities as a human being. Phronēsis is precisely the
disclosure of the “in each case,” of the practical situation of future-oriented action in
the context of one’s utmost possibilities.
[F]or it [sc. phronēsis] is concerned with what is ultimate [tou eschatou] . . . , and the
matter of action [to prakton] is such. . . . It [phronēsis] is not knowledge [epistēmē] but a
perception [aisthēsis] of the ultimate, . . . in the sense in which we perceive that a
triangle is the ultimate geometrical figure; even there, one must stop. (6.8.1142a24, 25,
26–27, 28–29)
Just as sophia views the unchanging intelligible structure of reality in terms of
an insight into the most universal principles of intelligibility that can no longer be
discursively analyzed but can simply be grasped, phronēsis is  based  on  a  material
perception (aisthēsis) of a concrete lived situation as an “ultimate” particular fact that
cannot  be  further  analyzed but  must  simply be  acted upon.  Like  the  perception of
geometrical truths, situational perception essentially involves possibility. In the case
of a triangle, we intuitively perceive that it is not possible to come up with a more
elementary polygon; in the case of a concrete situation of action, we grasp what it is
possible to do in that situation (to prakton) so as to contribute to the enactment of a
good life.
This future-oriented dimension of possibility is the temporal horizon or context
that makes the situation singular and unique. Situations of action are the context-
sensitive facets of meaningful reality; whereas ultimate universal principles are
permanently intelligible at all times as identical and unchanging, ultimate singular
situations have no permanence at all and cannot be reproduced as identical. In this
sense, practical “perception” is the exact opposite of theoretical intuition, but here,
Aristotle’s terminology vacillates in an interesting manner—in another passage
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(6.11.1143a32–b5), he characterizes practical perception precisely as a form of nous,
arguing that nous discloses the primal unanalyzable elements of meaningfulness in
“both directions,” that is, in terms of ultimate universality as well as ultimate
particularity.
In his 1924–25 lecture course on Plato’s Sophist,  Heidegger  sums  up  the
temporal determinations of sophia and phronēsis:
Phronēsis is catching sight of the just-this-once [Diesmaligen], of the concrete singularity
[Diesmaligkeit] of the instantaneous situation [augenblicklichen Lage]. As aisthēsis, it is the
glance of the eye, the instantaneous glance [Augen-blick] at what, in each instance [jeweils], is
concrete, which as such can always be otherwise. On the other hand, the noein in sophia is a
contemplation [Betrachten] of that which is aei, that which is always present [gegenwärtig]
in sameness. Time (the instant and being-always) here functions to discriminate
between the noein in phronēsis and the noein in sophia. (Heidegger 1992, 163–164; 2003b,
112–113; trans. mod.)
As William McNeill (1999, 93–136) has shown, we discover here, in the reading of
Nicomachean Ethics 6, the roots of Heidegger’s own notions of the “instant”
(Augenblick), the temporally multidimensional, dynamic, and context-sensitive
present.5 This notion is absolutely central for philosophical hermeneutics. It
describes the most primordial form of the meaningful temporal present as a singular
instant, constituted as meaningful in terms of a temporal context consisting of two
other temporal “ecstases”: futural possibilities as well as a factical past or “already-
having-been” (Gewesenheit) that always already delimits the possibilities of a given
situation (Heidegger 2001, 323–331; 2010, 309–316). This temporal contextuality of
the primordial present is also the ontological foundation for the hermeneutic circle
of understanding: the phenomenon to be interpreted is in each case approached in
terms of an implicit preunderstanding that delimits in advance the possibilities for
understanding in the sense of projecting (Entwerfen) existential possibilities upon a
futural  dimension  of  sense  (Sinn; 2001, 142–153; 2010, 138–149). However, our
encounter with the phenomenon may make us reconsider our preunderstanding and
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discover its finite, particular, and historical nature, thereby freeing up new
interpretive possibilities.
Heidegger attributes the discovery of the “instant” to Kierkegaard, maintaining
that with this discovery, Kierkegaard has introduced the possibility of a “completely
new epoch of philosophy . . . for the first time since antiquity” (Heidegger 1983, 225;
1995, 150). This is, of course, the hermeneutic epoch in which philosophy focuses on
the singularity and situatedness of meaning. Yet the outline of this epoch-making
discovery was drawn already in Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis. “Aristotle already
saw the phenomenon of the instant [Augenblicks], the kairos, and he circumscribed it
in Book 6 of his Nicomachean Ethics” (Heidegger 1975, 409; 1988b, 288; trans. mod.).
Indeed, Aristotle himself notes that because of their lack of fixity, particular cases of
action do not fall within the scope of any set of rules, but the agents themselves
must,  in  each  case,  “examine  matters  relevant  to  the  situation  [ta pros ton kairon
skopein]”  (Nicomachean Ethics 2.2.1104a3–9). However, Heidegger (1975, 409; 1988b,
288) goes on, Aristotle never connected this analysis with his specific account of time
in Physics 4,  thus  failing  to  “bring  the  specific  time-character  of  the kairos into
connection with what he otherwise knows as time.”
Gadamer was profoundly influenced by Heidegger’s reappropriation of the
hermeneutic potential of Aristotle’s practical philosophy, and kept returning to the
topic again and again throughout his career.6 His own viewpoint is summarized in
the chapter of Truth and Method discussing the “hermeneutic relevance of Aristotle”
(Gadamer 1990, 317–329; 2004, 310–321). What is essential in the Aristotelian
phronēsis is for Gadamer the fact that it is a form of knowledge “directed towards the
concrete situation. Thus it must grasp the ‘circumstances’ [Umstände] in their infinite
variety” (1990, 27; 2004, 19). Phronēsis grasps  the  “concrete,”  that  is,  singular  and
contextual situation, in terms of the wider teleological dimension of enacting the
good  human  life  as  a  whole.  At  the  same  time,  it  looks  at  the  human  good  not  in
general terms but from the point of view of what it means in this specific situation.
The phronetic grasping of the situation is thus a process that already involves the
hermeneutic circle. It is a two-way dialogue that approaches the “particular” in
terms of the “universal” yet, at the same time, understands this “universal” in terms
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of the “particular.” In other words, phronēsis is a matter of applying the universal in
a singular case and of understanding—interpreting and reappropriating—the
universal through this singular application.
In Truth and Method, Gadamer connects the hermeneutic relevance of Aristotle
precisely to the central question of application (Anwendung; 1990, 312–316; 2004, 306–
310). For philosophical hermeneutics, applying a discourse is not external or
subsequent to interpreting and understanding it, but interpretation is rather always
already a two-way process of application, of interpreting one’s hermeneutic
situation in light of an existing discourse and of reinterpreting this discourse in light
of the singular situation. It is in this sense that Aristotle’s analysis of practical insight
“offers  a  kind  of model of the problems of hermeneutics.”  In  this  model,  in  order  to
understand the “universal”—the text—the interpreter “must not try to disregard
himself and his particular hermeneutic situation. He must relate the text to this
situation if he wants to understand at all” (1990, 329; 2004, 320–321).
To conclude this tentative assessment of the ancient philosophical legacy of
hermeneutics: we have seen that this legacy has an essentially twofold character. On
the one hand, ancient thought restricted the activity of interpreting to certain limited
contexts—first and foremost the “daimonic” mediation between the divine and the
human realms and the closely related task of performing and explaining the work of
poets, the “interpreters” of the gods—and sharply distinguished between the
inspired “interpretive” activity of poetry and the rational accounts of philosophers.
Moreover,  while  material  language was conceived as  a  form of hermēneia, this first
and foremost meant a verbalization and transmission of immaterial and universal
discursive meaning which left no need for interpretation in the radical Heideggerian
sense of projecting future-oriented situational meaning.
Nonetheless, the philosophical hermeneutics of the twentieth century drew
some of its central conceptual resources from Aristotle’s practical philosophy, but in
a way that involved overturning the internal hierarchy of the Aristotelian intellectual
virtues, first and foremost that of phronēsis and sophia. Nicomachean Ethics 6 concludes
that it is sophia which  is  the  “most  accurate  [akribestatē] form of knowledge”
(Nicomachean Ethics 6.7.1141a16–17); it is both a knowledge of (epistēmē) and an
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insight into (nous) the things that are supreme (timiōtatōn) by nature (6.7.1141b2–3). It
would, Aristotle adds, be strange indeed to regard phronēsis or its communal
application, political prudence, as the most weighty (spoudaiotatē) form of
knowledge, “supposing that the human being is not the most excellent being
[ariston]  in  the  world-order  [kosmos]” (6.7.1141a20–22). In the “theological”
culmination of Aristotle’s ethics, theōria, pure disinterested contemplation of reality
in the light of its ultimate intelligible principles, is shown to be the supreme form of
human flourishing, eudaimonia—precisely insofar as theōria is an essentially
superhuman activity, one that rises above the contextuality and contingency of
mortal affairs (10.7.1177a12–18, b26–1178a8; 10.8.1178b7–32).7
For the ontotheological ethics of Aristotle, firmly inscribed within the ancient
and medieval ethical tradition reaching from Parmenides to Thomas Aquinas, the
culmination of human active and intellectual being is thus the escape of thinking
from the situatedness of “merely” human existence to the autarkic beholding of the
divine and the absolute. Philosophical hermeneutics, by contrast, is precisely the
philosophical embracing of this irreducible mortal situatedness of humanly
accessible meaning, and in this respect it indeed marks an entirely “new
philosophical epoch” with regard to antiquity.
16
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Endnotes
1 Dannhauer  uses  the  term hermeneutics in his treatise Idea boni interpretis (Dannhauer 1630, 11) to
designate a general “grammar” common to law, theology, and medicine; cf. Thouard 2011, 248. In
1654, he published a methodological treatise on Biblical exegesis bearing the title Hermeneutica sacra.
2 However, the etymologies of hermēneus/hermēneuein and of Hermes are uncertain, and there is no
conclusive evidence that they are connected; see Chantraine 2009, 356–357.
3 Porphyry, according to Boethius (Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri hermēneias, vol. 2, 29.29–30.10),
says that the Peripatetic school of Aristotle distinguished a particular “mental” level of language in
addition to spoken and written language (see Sorabji 2012).
4 The Latin prudentia,  “prudence,” is a contraction of providentia, “foresight, providence” (Aubenque
2002,  35n2).  It  is  possible  to  understand  Heidegger’s  term Umsicht, “circumspection”—one of his
translations for phronēsis (Heidegger 1992, 21–22; 2003b, 15–16)—in an analogous sense: what is meant
is an Um-zu-sehen,  a  “seeing-in-order-to,”  that  sees  the  situation  in  terms  of  a  futural  dimension  of
purpose.
5 On Heidegger’s interpretation of phronēsis, see also Volpi 1988; Bernasconi 1990; Elliott 2002, 225–
262; Long 2002; Brogan 2005, 138–148, 169–178; Backman 2007; Ruoppo 2007; Elm 2007; Pedersen
2010. Comparisons between Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s readings of phronēsis are  carried  out  in
Coltman 1998, 11–24; Figal 1995; Svenaeus 2003.
6 For Gadamer’s main independent studies on Aristotle’s practical philosophy (besides Truth and
Method and his studies on Heidegger’s readings of Greek philosophy), see Gadamer 1972; 1985, 164–
186, 230–248; 1986, 159–178; 1987, 175–188; 1991, 373–395; 1993, 301–329; 1995, 238–246, 259–266; 1999,
18–36, 142–161; 2007, 227–265, 274–289; 2015 as well as his commented and annotated German
translation of Nicomachean Ethics 6. For discussions of Gadamer’s reappropriation of phronēsis, see
Risser 1984; Figal 1995; Coltman 1998, 11–24; Berti 2000; Svenaeus 2003.
7 Heidegger (1992, 171; 2003b, 117) explains the temporal metaphysical roots of this hierarchy:
“[B]ecause sophia is the purest way of comportment to, and of tarrying with, the everlasting, therefore sophia,
as a genuine positionality toward this highest mode of being, is the highest possibility.” On Gadamer’s more
ambivalent approach to this hierarchy, see Berti 2000.
